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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The mathematical calculation of the judgment by the trial court is correct. 
2. In equity, the remedy of constructive trust is an bound by no set formula. 
3. Procedural due process is not denied by a remedy that is accurate and fair. 
REFERENCE TO OPINION 
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals is attached as Exhibit B to the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari arises from Opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals dated February 17, 2000 and the subsequent Order by the Court of Appeals denying the 
a Petition for Rehearing dated April 3, 2000. The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction 
over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) and Utah Constitution., art. VIII, § 3. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The controlling constitutional provisions and statutes are set forth in Appendix D to the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Appendix B of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below. 
This Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari concerns a final judgment and order from 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah entered by the Honorable Steven 
L. Hansen on May 12, 1998. A subsequent motion for a new trial or to correct judgment was 
denied by the court in October 1998. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals was dated February 
17, 2000, and the subsequent Order denying the Petition for Rehearing was dated April 3, 2000. 
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1. Plaintiff-Appellee LaRee Nielsen, nka LaRee Ricks, and the Defendant Robin Nielsen 
were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce dated July 16, 1984. (Tr. 11, Ex. 1). Pursuant to 
the stipulation, the original divorce decree granted custody of five of the children to Robin and 
the youngest remaining child to LaRee. Robin was also given possession of the family home. 
2. In December 1985, Robin was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of the child. At 
this time, LaRee took possession of the family home and custody of all of the children. Robin 
was incarcerated in July 1986. (R. 379.) 
3. An Order Modifying Divorce Decree was entered May 15, 1987. (Ex. 2.) LaRee was 
awarded complete and sole possession of the home until the youngest child reached the age of 
majority. LaRee was also granted custody of all of the children. Robin's support obligations 
were also modified. (Ex. 2.) 
4. On May 15, 1987, LaRee received a judgment against Robin in the sum of $13,815.74, 
plus interest that represented her unpaid portion of the retirement benefits and her attorney's fees 
(1987 Retirement Judgment). 
5. On February 1, 1988, LaRee received a judgment against Robin in the sum of $8,000 
for the nonpayment of alimony and child support (1988 Alimony/Support Judgment). 
6. In March 1995, LaRee filed this action to recover unpaid child support and alimony, 
and to quiet title to the home. (R. 5.) In her first cause of action, LaRee alleged that there was a 
balance of $3,526.81, plus interest, from the 1987 Retirement Judgment. 
7. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by the parties. (R. 98, 159.) By 
Memorandum Decision, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants as 
to the issues of the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act and constructive trust. The underpinnings of 
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the constructive trust summary judgment were contract doctrines. The trial court denied 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as it related to taxes, insurance, repairs, and 
maintenance. (R. 256.) 
8. A pretrial and scheduling conference was held on August 13, 1997, at which time the 
trial court entered an Advance Trial Management Order. (R. 266.) Counsel were directed to 
prepare a joint and agreed-upon pretrial order outlining the claims of the parties, contested issues 
of fact, contested issues of law, and a summary of supporting facts. (R. 266.) This Joint Pretrial 
Order was submitted February 6, 1998. (R. 329.) Prior to a previously scheduled trial date, a 
similar Joint Pretrial Order was submitted on or about June 13, 1996. (R. 95.) 
9. The matter was tried on February 9, 1998. During the trial, Laree asked the court to 
renew the unpaid portion of the judgment obtained on May 15, 1987 (Tr. 16) and the judgment 
obtained on February 1, 1988 (Tr. 18). The Court granted Motion to Amend the Complaint to 
renew these judgments in order to conform to the Pretrial Order. (Tr. 56; R. 378.) 
10. Following the trial, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (R. 381.) A judgment and order was entered on May 12, 1998. (R. 409.) 
11. Defendants filed a Motion for New Trial or to Correct Judgment. (R. 383.) The trial 
court denied this motion. (R. 429.) 
12. Defendants field their Notice of Appeal on October 20, 1998. 
13. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals issued a 
decision on February 17, 2000. The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing on April 
3, 2000. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiff-Appellee LaRee Nielsen, nka LaRee Ricks, and Defendant Robin Nielsen were 
divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce dated July 16, 1984. (R. 381, Ex.1.) At the time of the 
divorce, LaRee and Robin had six children. Pursuant to stipulation, Robin was granted physical 
custody of all of the children, except for the youngest child, together with possession of the 
family home until the youngest child reached the age of 18. (R. 319, Ex. 1.) Pursuant to the 
Decree of Divorce, the equity in the home was to be divided equally except for a $6,000 credit 
for Robin for money he obtained from his parents' estate and used in the acquisition of the home. 
(R. 319, Ex. 1.) 
According to the original Decree of Divorce, Robin was ordered to pay $200 per month in 
alimony and $200 per month in support for the youngest child. LaRee Nielsen was also awarded 
half of the current interest in Robin's retirement account. (R. 318, Ex. 1.) 
In December 1995, Robin was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a child. (R. 379, 
Tr. 64.) Said charges were tried in March and April 1986. (Tr. 64.) To care for the children, 
LaRee took possession of the family home in December 1985 (Tr. 12) and has remained in the 
home since that time. 
Without LaRee's knowledge, Robin conveyed his interest in the home to his brother, Rod 
Nielsen, in a quit claim deed dated January 8, 1986 and recorded on January 10, 1986. (Ex. 3.) 
Robin was incarcerated in June 16, 1986 at the Utah State Prison. (Tr. 64.) That day, 
Robin withdrew his retirement account, in the sum of roughly $32,000, and sent it to his brother 
Rod. (Tr. 64, R. 378.) 
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Soon after Robin's incarceration, LaRee filed for modification of the Divorce Decree. 
The Decree of Divorce was modified in an Order Modifying Divorce Decree dated May 15, 
1987, in which LaRee was awarded fully custody of the four remaining minor children and 
granted full, complete, and sole possession of the family home, until the youngest child reached 
the age of majority. (Ex. 2.) Robin's child support obligation was modified and reduced to the 
amount of $100 per child per month. The alimony obligation was modified and reduced to $100 
per month. (Ex. 2.) 
On May 15, 1987, as part of the Order Modifying Divorce Decree, LaRee received a 
judgment in the amount of $13,815.74, plus interest, representing her unpaid portion of the 
retirement benefits and attorney's fees (1987 Retirement Judgment). (R. 378, Ex. 2, Ex. 4.) Rod 
subsequently sent LaRee $10,288.93 as payment against the 1987 Retirement Judgment. (Tr. 15, 
R. 378.) After crediting he amount received from Rod Nielsen, the balance of the unpaid 
principal and interest at the time of trial was $11,616.44. (Ex. 16.) 
Then, on February 1, 1988, LaRee obtained a judgment against Robin in the amount of 
$8,000 for delinquent alimony and child support beginning August 1986 through and including 
November 1987 (1988 Alimony/Support Judgment). (Ex. 5.) At the time of the judgment, no 
objections to the judgment were made. (R. 378.) No payments have been paid toward this 
judgment. (R. 378.) 
In addition, since December 1987, Robin has paid nothing toward alimony and child 
support. (R. 326.) Total child support and alimony arrearage, as calculated by the trial court, 
amounted to $64,521.55. (R. 374, Ex. 16.) 
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LaRee made the mortgage payments from 1986 until debt on the home was retired in 
1994, the sum of principal and interest totaling $25,767.10. (Tr. 25, 26; Ex. 6.) In addition, 
LaRee paid the property taxes, insurance, and maintenance during this time. 
Using a sales comparison approach, the home was appraised for $156,000 in June 1996. 
(Ex. 10.) This is the amount at which the trial court valued the home. (R. 376.) 
Subtracting the mortgage payments made by LaRee in the amount of $25,767.10 from the 
appraised value of $156,000, the trial court concluded that the equity in the home was 
$130,232.90.) (R. 374.) This left $65,116.45 in equity for each party before considering any 
credits or offsets. (R. 374.) The trial court allowed Robin a $6,000 credit for his inheritance that 
was used toward the initial payment for the as evidenced in the Decree of Divorce, giving Robin 
equity in the amount of $71,116.45. From this amount, the amounts of $ 11,616.44 and 
$64,521.55, which represented the noncomplete payment of the retirement funds and the support 
arrearage, were subtracted. This resulted in $5,021.54 still owing to LaRee after being credited 
for her equitable share in the home. (R. 374.) The Court of Appeals held that the $64,521.55 
figure had been miscalculated because the trial court added compounded rather than simple 
interest. 
Rod Nielsen did not give Robin Nielsen adequate consideration for the quit claim deed; 
any loans Rod gave to Robin during Robin's marriage were of an unspecified amount, were of 
small amounts given periodically, and were not memorialized in writing. (R. 377, Tr. 47-48.) 
The money received by Rod from Robin's retirement funds more than satisfied any obligation 
Robin had to Rod. (R. 377, Tr. 65-67.) Finding that Rod was acting as a constructive trustee in a 
confidential relationship for Robin's equity in the home (R. 377), the trial court decreed that all 
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right, title, and interest in the real property be adjudged and decreed to be the property of LaRee 
Nielsen. (R. 408.) LaRee was also awarded judgment against Robin Nielsen in the amount of 
$5,021.54. (R.409.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court of Appeals articulated the correct standard of review: 
"On appeal from a bench trial we view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the trial court's findings . . . ." Further, it is well settled that "[w]e do not 
reverse a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous," and 
"[w]hen challenging a trial court's findings, 4[a]n appellant must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the 
clear weight of the evidence.'"" 
Nielsen v. Nielsen, 2000 UT App 37, 1 (Utah App.) (citations omitted). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
I. The Mathematical Calculation of the Judgment by the Trial Court is Correct, 
The trial court entered judgment against Robin A. Nielsen (Robin) in favor of LaRee 
Ricks (LaRee) in the amount of $76,137.99. This judgment represented two facets of the parties' 
divorce, namely (1) LaRee's share of Robin's pension and (2) unpaid child support and alimony 
from August 1986 onward. In this appeal, Robin seeks to modify the judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that there were clerical mistakes in the 
judgment. However, there were no clerical mistakes in the trial court's judgment (except that 
interest should not have been compounded, as the Court of Appeals held). An explanation of the 
trial court's calculation the judgment follows below: 
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A. The Calculation of the 1987 Pension Judgment is Correct 
On May 15, 1987, LaRee obtained a judgment against Robin for $13,814.74 for 
incomplete payment of LaRee's share of Robin's retirement funds (1987 Retirement Judgment). 
From the time that this judgment was entered until the current matter was heard, Rod Nielsen (on 
behalf of Rod) had paid LaRee $10,288.93 in satisfaction of the judgment. At the time of trial, 
the trial court found that the remaining balance on the 1987 Retirement Judgment was $3,526.81. 
Further, as of February 1998, interest had accrued on this outstanding balance at the rate of 12% 
per annum, which interest totaled $8,089.63. The trial court concluded that this judgment should 
be renewed. Hence the amount of $11,616.44 stemming from the 1987 Pension Judgment 
became part of the current trial court's judgment. The trial court made no clerical mistakes in 
entering this judgment. 
B. The Calculation of the 1988 Alimony/Support Judgment is Correct. 
On February 1, 1988, LaRee obtained a judgment against Robin in the amount of $8,000 
for child support and alimony arrearage owing for the period of August 1986 to November 1987 
(the 1988 Alimony/Support Judgment). The trial court found that Robin made no objection to 
this 1988 Alimony/Support Judgment at the time it was rendered. (R. 378.) 
The trial court also allowed the 1988 Alimony/Support Judgment to be renewed. This 
1988 Alimony/Support Judgment, together with unpaid alimony at the rate of $100 per month, 
beginning in December 1987, unpaid child support at the rate of $100 per month for each child 
(until each child reached the age of eighteen), also beginning in December 1987, and interest at 
the rate of 7.23 % per annum made up the other portion of the trial court's judgment. The total 
amount of judgment for unpaid child support and alimony arrearage was $64,521.55. Again, 
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there was no clerical mistake in entering this judgment (except, as the Court of Appeals clarified, 
that interest should not have been compounded). 
C. No Clerical Mistake Was Made By the Trial Court. 
Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "Clerical mistakes in 
judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or 
omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party . . . ." Ut. R. Civ. Pro. 60(a) (emphasis added). Robin cannot show such a clerical 
oversight or omission was made in the judgment by the trial court. The obvious purpose behind 
the rule is to allow a party to correct a judgment when, for some clerical reason, the amount of 
the judgment is different from the amount that the trial court determined. This Court has held 
that the question of whether a (purported) error is "judicial" or "clerical" depends not on who 
made it, but on whether it was made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment. 
Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984). The Rule is not intended to correct errors of a 
substantial nature, particularly where the claim of error is unilateral. Id. The correction 
contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the court 
and parties. Id. 
Rule 60(a) should not be used as a vehicle for a party to have an open-ended opportunity 
to re-litigate the merits and amount of a judgment. In the current case, the trial court heard 
evidence concerning delinquent alimony and child support payments, past judgments, and 
principal and interest calculations, and received supporting exhibits. (Ex. 12, 15, and 16.) 
LaRee was also cross examined concerning these facts. The calculations of LaRee were accurate, 
true, and correct and were accepted by the court. The court then made its Findings. 
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D. This Court Should Not Receive New Evidence, 
Instead of correcting a clerical mistake, Robin Nielsen now seeks, through this appeal, to 
present new evidence concerning the judgment amount. To permit Robin to submit calculations 
without foundation or cross examination flies in the face of the purpose of a trial court in 
accepting evidence and the function of an appeal of reviewing the trial for legal errors. 
Moreover, the calculations submitted by Robin in his Petition are inaccurate, incomplete, 
confusing, and are not supported by the Record. (Pet. Cert., p. 6.) 
For example, the alimony and child support calculations in the Petition begin in May 
1987. However, the child support and alimony obligations from the commencement of the 
divorce until November 1987 have already been reduced to a judgment in the 1988 
Support/Alimony Judgment. Because no clerical mistake was made, the time for determining 
whether the trial court rendered judgment for the correct amount in 1988 has past. Rule 60(a) 
contemplates modifications to judgments for clerical errors; it does not provide for procedure to 
examine all the facts supporting a judgment. 
POINT TWO 
II. In Equity, the Remedy of Constructive Trust is Bound by No Set Formula. 
A. The Petitioners Waived the Argument that the Trial Court Created a 
New Set of Plaintiffs' Rights. 
The argument that the trial court and the Court of Appeals created a new set of plaintiffs' 
rights by imposing a constructive trust has been raised for the first time in the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. Where an appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is waived. Bott v. 
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Deland, 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996). The Petitioners did not brief this issue to the Court of 
Appeals, although it was available to be briefed. The Court should not grant certiorari to hear it. 
B. Nevertheless, the Remedy of Constructive Trust, as Ordered by the Lower 
Courts, Does Not Create a New Set of Plaintiffs5 Rights. 
This Court has held that it will only disturb the trial court's decree of constructive trust if 
it constitutes abuse of discretion. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1041 (Utah 
1995). 
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment. Ashton v. 
Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987); In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 111,114 (Utah 1982); 
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977); Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 23, 
253 P.2d 372, 375 (1953); Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 216, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (1949). If the 
evidence is of a clear and convincing nature warranting the remedy, the trial court may alter a 
deed which is regular in form and is presumed to convey a clear and unambiguous title. Ashton, 
733 P.2d at 151; In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d at 1114. 
"A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by no unyielding formula, 
but is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each transaction wherever a 
failure to perform a duty to convey property would result in unjust enrichment." Haws, 209 P.2d 
at 232. "Constructive trusts include all those instances in which a trust is raised by the doctrines 
of equity for the purpose of working out justice in the most efficient manner, where there is no 
intention of the parties to create such a relation." Parks v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 
599 (Utah 1983) (citing J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1044 (1941)). 
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Constructive trust does not create a new set of plaintiffs' rights as the Petitioners have 
argued. Rather, it is a time-tested remedy that is steeped in the law of equity. The Utah 
Legislature did not intend to abrogate or "preempt" the remedy of constructive trust merely 
because a plaintiff may use the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act to accomplish the same end as 
constructive trust might accomplish. A variety of causes of action may be used to accomplish the 
same purpose. The fact the various causes of action have different statutes of limitation1 does not 
mean that this Court should eliminate one in favor of another, or that the Utah Legislature had 
the intention of doing so when it enacted legislation. Such jurisprudence would cause utter chaos 
in the law. 
C. The Petitioners Have Failed to Marshall the Evidence, and Cannot Prove, that 
the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion. 
Moreover, although the Petitioners assail the trial court's findings of fact (Pet. Cert., p. 8), 
the Petitioners fail to challenge sufficiently the trial court's findings that imposed a constructive 
trust. As explained in Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), there is a "duty 
incumbent upon an appellant to mount a successful challenge to a trial court's findings of fact. 
An appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings." Because 
the Petitioners have not challenged those findings and has not demonstrated that the trial court 
abused its discretion, see Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1041, the trial court's findings should not be 
disturbed. Ashton, 733 P.2d at 150. 
'The Court of Appeals held that four year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25(3) applied to the doctrine of constructive trust, rather than the four-year statute of 
limitations (after the transfer) found in the UtahTraudulent Transfer Act, § 25-6-10, as asserted 
by the Petitioners. Respondent argues that any time limitation for constructive trust should be at 
least four years after discovery. 
12 
In paragraphs 21 through 23 of the trial court's Findings of Fact, the court found: 
21. Before Robin Nielsen went to prison he conveyed his interest in the home 
to his brother Rod by quit-claim deed dated January 8, 1986. This deed was 
recorded on January 10, 1986. 
22. Rodney Nielsen testified that the consideration he gave for the quit claim 
deed were the loans which he gave Robin during Robin's marriage. These were 
of an unspecified amount as they were small loans given periodically and not 
memorialized in writing. Robin Nielsen testified that he transferred his retirement 
account to Rod in satisfaction of the loans which he had received from Rod. The 
Court finds that Robin owed Rod only a few thousand dollars at the time of the 
divorce and the transfer of the retirement account and that there was no 
consideration given by Rod to Robin for the quit-claim deed. 
23. The Court finds that Rod obtained the quit-claim deed of Robin's interest 
in the home so that he could preserve his brother's interest in the home as Robin 
was going to prison. Thus the Court finds that Rod has been acting as an 
constructive trustee for Robin's equity in the home. 
(R. 377, 378.) 
The trial court also found that Rod Nielsen acted as a constructive trustee for Robin of 
any remaining balance of the retirement funds. (R. 378.) The very day he went to prison, Robin 
withdrew his retirement account (Tr. 64), in the sum of roughly $32,000, and gave it to his 
brother Rod. (Tr 64, R. 378). Rod testified that he was holding the funds from Robin's 
retirement account while Robin was in prison. (Tr. 50, R. 378). Robin later testified that he gave 
the funds to Rod because he owed him money from the numerous loans given to him over the 
years. (Tr. 65-66, R. 378). The Petitioners have not cited any facts in the record that are contrary 
to these that would warrant disturbing the trial court's constructive trust remedy. 
D. The Petitioners Have Not Marshaled the Evidence that LaRee Had Constructive 
Notice of the Quit Claim Deed from Robin to Rod. 
The trial court found that LaRee first discovered the conveyance to Rod on May 15, 1991, 
when she made an application for a loan. (R. 377.) This is a factual finding that the Petitioners 
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do not contest on appeal. See Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995) ("[T]he 
issue of when a claimant discovered or should have discovered the facts forming the basis of a 
cause of action is a question of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion cannot be overturned on 
appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.") Although constructive notice may have occurred when the 
deed was recorded, again the Petitioners have failed to marshal any evidence in the record that 
LaRee had notice of the facts which would justify imposing the constructive trust before May 15, 
1991. 
POINT THREE 
II. Procedural Due Process is not Denied by a Remedy that is Accurate and Fair. 
A. The Petitioners Waived the Argument that the Trial Court Denied Them 
Due Process. 
Here also, the Petitioners raise the argument that they were denied due process for the 
first time in this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Where an appellant fails to brief an issue on 
appeal, the point is waived. Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996). The Petitioners did not 
brief this issue to the Court of Appeals, although it was available to be briefed. The Court should 
not grant certiorari to hear it. 
B. The Purpose of Procedural Due Process is to Produce Decisions that are 
Accurate, 
The Petitioners have claimed that the trial court deprived them of procedural due process 
under the due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution, amend. V (or, presumably, amend. XIV) 
and the Utah Constitution, art. I, § 1? This due process argument concerns two aspects of the 
2The Utah Supreme Court has held that tfie due process clauses of the Federal and State 
Constitutions are substantially similar, and that the decisions of the federal Supreme Court are 
highly persuasive to the application of Utah's due process clause. Untermeyer v. State Tax 
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litigation below, (1) that the trial court granted the Motion to Amend to enable LaRee to renew 
her judgments, and (2) that the trial court granted the remedy of constructive trust after hearing 
the evidence when the trial court had already ostensibly granted summary judgment for the 
defendants on the issue of constructive trust. 
The United States Supreme Court has written that, 
The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and 
in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. 
Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term must apply, 
flexibility is necessary to gear this process to the particular need; the quantum and 
quality of the process due in a particular situation depend upon the need to serve 
the purpose of minimizing the risk of error. 
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). See 
also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (due process functions to "prevent unfair and mistaken 
deprivations" of life, liberty and property.) The principal reason for procedural safeguards, then, 
is to prevent inaccurate decisions. 
C. Granting the Motion to Amend Afforded Procedural Due Process. 
In March 1995, LaRee filed this action to recover all past-due child support and alimony 
payments owed through February 1995. (R. 5.) In her first cause of action, LaRee also alleged 
that there was a balance of $3,526.81, plus interest, from the retirement monies transferred to 
Defendant Rod Nielsen. (R. 3.) The original complaint effectively claims and puts Robin and 
Rod on notice that she is pursuing all past due child support and alimony arrearage as well as the 
unpaid balance of the retirement monies. The two judgments entered on February 1, 1988 (Ex. 
Comm'n, 102 Utah 14, 129 P.2d 881 (194ZJ. 
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5) and May 15, 1987 (Ex. 4) fall within the eight year statute of limitations from the time the 
Complaint was filed. 
A pretrial and scheduling conference was held on August 13, 1997. At that time the trial 
court entered an Advance Trial Management Order. (R. 266.) Counsel were directed to prepare 
a joint and agreed upon pretrial order outlining the claims of the parties and the issues to be tried. 
(R. 266.) The Joint Pretrial Order was submitted February 6, 1999. (R. 329.) A similar Joint 
Pretrial Order was submitted on or about June 13, 1996, prior to a previously scheduled trial 
date. (R. 95.) In both pretrial orders, the two delinquent judgments were identified as claims of 
LaRee. 
During the trial, Plaintiff LaRee Nielsen asked the court to renew the unpaid portion of 
the judgment obtained on May 15, 1987 (Tr. 16) and the judgment obtained on February 1, 1988 
(Tr. 18.) The court granted the Motion to Amend to renew these judgments in order to conform 
to the Pretrial Order. (Tr. 56; R. 378.) 
A primary purpose of a pretrial order is to narrow the issues so that the parties do not 
have to go back and amend their pleadings and such. A pretrial order, in essence, becomes a 
pleading. At trial, parties are governed by the pretrial order. 
In any event, Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the trial court to 
grant LaRee's Motion to Amend her Complaint. Rule 15(b) states: 
(1) When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to 
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. (2) If evidence is objected to at the 
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court 
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may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court 
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action 
or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to 
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
Utah R. Civ. Pro, 15(b) (numbering added). 
The facts of this case arguably fall within the first and second part of the Rule. Under the 
first part, the issue of renewing the two judgments was tried by express or implied consent as 
identified and agreed to in the Joint Pretrial Order. The amendments were permitted to conform 
the pleadings to the evidence. The second part of the rule is also applicable because objections 
were made at the trial that the issues of the renewed judgments were not properly plead. The 
merits of the action would have been defeated by not allowing the pleadings to be amended. The 
Defendants failed to satisfy the court that they would be prejudiced by the admission of the past 
judgments, nor did they request a continuance to enable them to meet such evidence. Because 
the Defendants were put on noticeS as early as the Complaint and certainly at the time of the 
Pretrial Orders that the two judgments were claimed by LaRee Nielsen, they cannot claim they 
were prejudiced. 
Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth that the amendments relate 
back to the original pleading. This brings both judgment well within the required statute of 
limitations. The trial court's decision to grant the Motion to Amend does not affect the accuracy 
of its findings of fact or conclusions of law. Procedural due process was thus provided. 
D. The Remedy of Constructive Trust does not Deprive of Due Process, 
Finally, the Petitioners claim that they were deprived of substantive due process by the 
trial court's decree of constructive trust. The Petitioners rely on the trial court's earlier 
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Memorandum Decision rendered from the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment. (R. 256.) In 
its earlier decision the trial court applied principles of contract law in granting the Defendants' 
Motion, stating: "As a general rule, none is liable upon a contract except those two are parties to 
it;" and "It is axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a 
contract." (R. 251, 252 (citations omitted).) In this earlier decision, the trial court recognized 
that in theory, Rod could be unjustly enriched, "but the contract or medium through which he 
obtained this wealth, is between Robin Nielsen and himself and not between LaRee Nielsen and 
[Rod] Nielsen. (R. 251.) Yet through the trial the court gained a better understanding of the 
facts and the equitable doctrines and rightly changed its position. 
The Petitioners appear to argue that the trial court's summary judgment became the law 
of the case and that because it was the law of the case the trial court could not change its 
decision. This argument is legally incorrect. On this issue, the Utah Supreme Court wrote that. 
The law of the case doctrine is not a limit on judicial power, but only a practice 
designed "to protect both court and parties against the burdens of repeated 
reargument by indefatigable diehards." 18 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 789-90 (1981) [hereinafter Federal Practice]. 
"The doctrine is not an inexorable command that rigidly binds a court to its 
former decisions but rather is an expression of good sense and wise judicial 
practice." Carp, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 567 F.2d 1316, 1320 (5th Cir. 1978),. . 
. see Salt Lake City, Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 n.5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Among situations where reconsideration of a previously 
decided issue is recognized as desirable, notwithstanding the law of the case, is 
when there is a "need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." 
Federal Practice, § 4478, at 790. As one appellate court observed, with all 
delicacy aside: "The only sensible thing for a trial court to do is to set itself right 
as soon as possible when convinced that the law of the case is erroneous. There is 
no need to await reversal." Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J.L. 
Cummins News Col, 632 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1980). Simply put, the law of 
the case doctrine does not prohibit a judge from catching a mistake and fixing it. 
Gilmore v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439 (Utah 1993) (Orem, J., concurring). 
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This was exactly what the trial judge did. As previously stated, a constructive trust is an 
equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment regardless of express or implied intention. See 
argument above, page 10. After being presented the evidence at trial, the trial court correctly 
recognized that in order to properly do justice according to the equitable interests in the home, it 
had no choice but to impose a constructive trust. The trial court was not bound by the set 
formula of contract law. Rod unquestionably had a duty to convey the equitable interest in the 
home as well as the remaining retirement proceeds to Robin. If not, Rod would be unjustly 
enriched. 
Under these circumstances, it was proper for the trial court to impose a constructive trust. 
Without such a remedy, LaRee would very likely not have a legitimate means of collecting the 
past judgments and arrearage for support. Refusing to recognizing a constructive trust, would set 
an ill-advised precedent of allowing a party with an interest in real property to secrete that 
interest by deeding it to a relative or other confidential relationship. Then, in the event that 
support payments are not paid, the aggrieved party would be relegated to the strict principles of 
contractual privity, and would be unable to recover in equity. Such a practice would allow the 
constructive trustee to act as a "conscious wrongdoer." See Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 
P.2d 590, 603 (Utah 1983). 
The well-reasoned decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals effected justice 
accurately and fairly. Imposing a constructive trust did not impinge upon the Defendants' right 
to procedural due process. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence heard by the trial court was of a clear and convincing nature warranting the 
equitable remedy of a constructive trust. The Court of Appeals was correct to affirm it. The 
calculations of the judgments should not be disturbed. These conclusions of law did not create 
new causes of action nor did the deprive any party of due process. Any other result, would 
unjustly enrich Rod Nielsen and permit Robin Nielsen to secret his assets, thus avoiding the 
duties of a parent and spouse, and likely making it impossible for LaRee Nielsen to satisfy her 
judgments. For these reasons, this Court should deny the Petitioner's request for a Writ of 
Certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this V^ day of June 2000. 
LOBERT L. MOODYtf ROBE
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee LaRee Nielsen 
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ADDENDUM "A 
COPIES OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND EXHIBITS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 15, AND 16 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, St3te of Utah 
CARMfrB. SMJJH, Clertc 
_ M _ Oeputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAREE R. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBIN A. NIELSEN and ROD NIELSON, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 950400143 
DATE: April 13, 1998 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
The above-captioned matter came before the Court for trial on February 9, 1998. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel Robert L. Moody and Defendants were 
present and represented by their counsel Shawn D. Turner. The Court having heard witnesses, 
having reviewed the file and the pleadings therein and having fully considered the evidence 
presented does hereby enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, Laree Nielsen, and Defendant, Robin Nielsen, were divorced in a 
Decree of Divorce dated the 16th day of July, 1984. 
2. At the time of divorce the parties had six children. Pursuant to stipulation, Robin 
Nielsen was granted custody of all of the children, except the youngest, and was also given 
possession of the family home. Accordingly, he was also given possession of the household 
furniture and other furnishings. 
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3. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, the court awarded one-half of the real property 
and the home in which they lived (716 West 580 South, Orem, Utah) to each party, excepting 
a $6,000 credit to Robin Nielsen as he had obtained this money from his parents estate and 
used such in the acquisition of the home. The house was worth $115,656 at the time of 
divorce. 
4. The Decree provided that the home was to be sold "when the youngest child 
reached the age of eighteen years or when the defendant remarries, or when the parties hereto 
can mutually agree it is in their best interest/ 
5. Pursuant to the Decree, Robin Nielsen was ordered to pay $200 per month in 
alimony and $200 per month in support for the youngest child. 
6. The Decree also awarded Laree Nielsen one-half of the current interest in Robin 
Nielsen's retirement account. 
7. The Decree of Divorce ordered Robin Nielsen to pay the costs associated with the 
case and an amount to his brother Rod which Rod had lent to Robin so that he could buy a 
van. 
8. The Decree of Divorce also awarded each party one car. Robin asserts that his car 
was involved in an accident and that Laree cashed the insurance check. The Court finds that 
there is insufficient evidence that Robin owned the car at the time of the accident, or that 
Laree in fact cashed the check which should have gone to Robin. Furthermore, as the accident 
occurred more than ten years ago it is well beyond the statute of limitations as no action nor 
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judgment has been pursued up until this time. 
9. In December of 1985, Robin Nielsen was charged with aggravated sexual abuse of 
a child, said charges were tried in March and April of 1986. Robin was incarcerated in July of 
1986. 
10. Laree Nielsen took possession of the home and custody of the children in 
December of 1985, and has remained in the home since that time. 
11. Robin Nielsen claims that he should have a credit of the estimated $25,000 worth 
of household furnishings and furniture which he did not receive. However, the Court finds that 
the intention of the award of the household items was that it accompany the house for the 
benefit of the children rather than as a property award to an individual party. 
12. After Robin Nielsen was incarcerated, Laree Nielsen filed for a modification of 
the Divorce Decree. The Order Modifying the Decree dated May 15, 1987 awarded Laree 
Nielsen complete and sole possession of the home until the youngest child reached the age of 
majority and gave her custody of all the children. Robin's support obligation was also changed 
so that he owed $100 per month in alimony and $100 per month per child for child support. 
13. Laree Nielsen has worked at Brigham Young University in the Missionary 
Training Center since 1985. She currently earns $1,800 per month. 
14. Laree Nielsen has not received child support nor alimony from her ex-husband, 
Robin Nielsen, since November of 1987. 
15. Laree received a judgment against Robin in the sum of $8,000 in February of 
1988 for the nonpayment of alimony and child support. At the time of the judgment no 
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objections to the judgment were made. Nothing has been paid towards that judgment. The 
Court allowed Plaintiff to amend her complaint and renew this judgment at trial. 
16. Robin did not pay his alimony or child support obligations since that time and 
there is now owing, including the 1988 judgment and interest, $64,521.55 in arrearages. 
17. Before Robin Nielsen was incarcerated in the State Penitentiary he withdrew his 
retirement account, in the sum of roughly $32,000, and gave it to his brother Rod. 
18. When asked why he received Robin's retirement account, Rod Nielsen testified 
that he was holding the funds while Robin was in prison. Robin later testified that he gave the 
funds to Rod as he owed him money from the numerous loans given to him over the years. 
The Court finds that Rod has acted as a constructive trustee for Robin of any remaining 
balance of the retirement funds. 
19. Laree Nielsen received a judgment in the amount of $13,815.74 plus interest at 
the legal rate of 12% representing her unpaid portion of the retirement benefits and attorney's 
fees. A letter was sent by Laree's attorney on July 21, 1987 identifying Rod Nielsen as the 
recipient of the funds from Robin Nielsen, and demanding that Robin have Rod pay the same 
to Laree. Rod subsequently sent Laree $10,288.93 against the judgment. 
20. Crediting the amount that Rod sent Laree from the retirement, there is a present 
balance of unpaid principle and interest in the sum of $11,616.44. The Court allowed the 
Plaintiff to amend her complaint and renew this judgment at trial. 
21. Before Robin Nielsen went to prison he conveyed his interest in the home to his 
brother Rod by quit-claim deed dated January 8, 1986. This deed was recorded on January 10, 
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1986. 
22. Rodney Nielsen testified that the consideration he gave for the quit-claim deed 
were the loans which he gave Robin during Robin's marriage. These were of an unspecified 
amount as they were small loans given periodically and not memorialized in writing. Robin 
Nielsen testified that he transferred his retirement account to Rod in satisfaction of the loans 
which he had received from Rod. The Court finds that Robin owed Rod only a few thousand 
dollars at the time of the divorce and the transfer of the retirement account and that there was 
no consideration given by Rod to Robin for the quit-claim deed. 
23. The Court finds that Rod obtained the quit-claim deed of Robin's interest in the 
home so that he could preserve his brother's interest in the home as Robin was going to prison. 
Thus, the Court finds that Rod has been acting as a constructive trustee for Robin's equity in 
the home. 
24. Laree Nielsen was not aware of this conveyance until 1991 when she sought to 
obtain a loan and the deed was discovered. 
25. Laree Neilsen paid the mortgage from December of 1985 to 1994, when the 
mortgage was paid in full. The principle and interest which she paid towards the mortgage 
over this time period was $25,767.10. 
26. Laree also paid the taxes and insurance on the house and lot during this time. The 
taxes totaled $12,073.44 and the insurance payments totaled $6,148.24. However, Laree never 
requested that Rod or Robin contribute to thcpayment of the tax or insurance costs. 
27. The house appraised for $156,000 using the comparable sale method in June of 
5 
f)Q 
1996. Another appraisal found the house and lot to be worth $145,000 using the comparable 
sale approach and $152,000 using the cost approach. The Court finds that the home is worth 
$156,000 as the appraisal estimating this amount was very thorough and convincing. The 
Court also notes that there was not much disparity in the estimates given. 
28. All of the children of the parties had turned eighteen by July of 1997. James 
turned eighteen in June of 1987, John turned eighteen in October of 1988, Mark turned 
eighteen in March of 1993, and Curtis turned eighteen in July of 1997. Anne and David had 
turned eighteen before the Decree was modified. 
29. The Court finds that Rod Nielsen asks that the home be sold as all of the children 
have now eighteen years of age or older. Rod claims that he has an interest in the home due to 
the quit-claim deed given him by his brother Robin. Laree Nielsen asserts that Rod does not 
have an interest in the home and that she is entitled to credits for the expenditures she has 
made towards the home since Robin went to prison and that the home should not be sold but 
remain in her possession. 
30. The Court finds that Laree Nielsen has paid maintenance and repair costs as 
illustrated in Exhibit 9, which total $18,398.24. However, there are many items which would 
not be considered repair or maintenance such as an expensive vacuum cleaner, storage 
payments, and a washing machine. 
31. Prior to filing the Complaint, Laree never asked Robin nor Rod to contribute to 
these expenditures. She testified that after they resisted paying the retirement benefits and 
alimony and child support owing her that she knew that they would not help with the 
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maintenance costs of the house. 
32. The Court finds that these claimed maintenance and repair costs did not enhance 
the value of the home as an improvement would, but rather kept the house and property from 
becoming wasted and in disrepair. This is evident by the appraisals which indicated that the 
house and lot had repair and maintenance concerns and was only in fair condition. Therefore, 
the Court does not find that Laree Nielsen should get any credit against Robin Nielsen's equity 
for these expenditures. 
The Court having made the above Findings of Facts now makes and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that there is owing from the judgment dated May 15, 1987, 
the sum of $11,616.44 including interest and that said judgment should be renewed. This 
judgment is the retirement benefits which were not paid in full to Laree Nielsen. 
2. The Court concludes that the February 1988 judgment should be renewed and that 
including this judgment, the accrued arrearage since that judgment, and the interest on these 
unpaid support obligations that Robin owes Laree $64,521.55. 
3. A constructive trust may be imposed if the grantee was in a confidential 
relationship with the grantor. Mattes v. Olearin, 759 P.2d 1177 (Utah App. 1988), cert, 
denied 713 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, a constructive trust is an equitable remedy to 
prevent unjust enrichment in absence of any express or implied intention to form a trust. Id. 
4. The Court concludes that under the facts as set forth in the foregoing Findings of 
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Fact that the Defendant, Rod Nielsen, is a constructive trustee of the home for and in behalf of 
Robin Nielsen, his brother. 
5. The Court concludes that Laree Nielsen is not entitled to contribution of the taxes, 
insurance, or maintenance and repair expenses as these expenses were a necessary burden of 
having the benefit of living in the home and Laree never asked Rod nor Robin for contribution 
of these expenses until this action was filed. 
6. The Court concludes that there is $130,232.90 of equity in the home as the home 
is valued at $156,000 and Laree has paid off the mortgage in the amount of $25,767.10. This 
would leave each party with $65,116.45 in equity before considering any credits or offsets. 
7. The Court concludes that there is still owing the $6,000 towards the initial down 
payment as evidenced in the Decree of Divorce. This would be paid to Robin Nielsen so that 
he could offset this against his inheritance. 
8. The $62,116.45 plus the $6,000 inheritance money would give Robin equity in the 
amount of $71,116.45. However, Robin owes Laree $11,616.44 for the noncomplete payment 
of his retirement funds as well as $64,521.55 of support arrearages. When these obligations 
are added into his equity, Robin Nielsen still owes Laree Nielsen $5,021.54. Judgment in the 
amount of $5,021.54 will be awarded to Laree Nielsen. 
9. The Court concludes that any right, title and interest in the real property located at 
716 West 580 South in Orem, Utah, more particularly described as: Lot 6, Plat 8, Woodcrest 
Heights, as recorded in the records of the Utah County Recorders Office be adjudged and 
decreed to be the property of Plaintiff, Laree R. Nielsen. 
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Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare a proposed order consistent with the terms of this 
Memorandum Decision and submit it to counsel for Defendant, prior to submission to the 
court for signature. 
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i-tLv-rvZji ur L I V O : 
Case No. 64537 
This rratter came on for hearing on the 27th day of March, 1984, 
plaintiff appearing in person and represented by her attorney, Stott ?. Earston, 
15 jEsq., and the defendant appearing in person and bv and through his attorney, 
16 iSheldon R. Carter, Esq.. Plaintiff and defendant having testified to iretters 
il 
17 .set forth in the Ccmclaint and Answer, the cour t beina fu l lv advised in the 
!l . ' , ' " 
15 premises, anc tne carties having presentee tneir evidence and the court having \\ 
i 
19 taken the iratter under advisement, and havinc made an entered its FindLncs of 
20 Fact and Conclusions at Law, IT IS HERESY ORDERED, AEJuDSD AND IECREED: 
21 ,, DECREE CF DIVORCE 
22 j 1. Luring this carriage defendant has physically and verballv abused 
23 ,'tihs plaintiff, causing her physical and mental distress and suffering and 
~L therefore entitles olaintiff to a Decree of Divorce and she is herebv divorced 
i; 
95 from the defendant to become final three months after the sicninc of the Decree 
II . . 
25 'Hnc entry bv the clerk into the Registry or Actions. 
ICH. NELSCN. '1 
*•_• — . r r a i IXI 
2. There have teen bom as issue of t h i s rrarriage s ix (6) chi ldren 
j to -wi t : ANNE >&?ZE NIELSEN, age 18; EAVID AAPON NIELSEN, ace 15; JAMES ANDSEW 
3 ItsIELSEN, ace 14; JC5N ASIC PAUL NIELSEN, ace 12; >£3C ALAN PHILLIP NIELSEN, ace 
|S; CJRTIS ANTHONY PETE?, NIELSEN, ace 4. The c c u r t apcrcves the s t i pu l a t i on of 
he p a r t i e s entered into a t the time of t r i a l concerning the jo in t custody of 
the s ix ch i ld ren , the p l a i n t i f f to have the p a r t i e s youngest chi ld , Cur t i s , in 
/' |Lner immediate custody and the defendant the e ther miner chi ldren with hi.T4, 
a [[together with a possession of the family heme u n t i l the youngest ch i ld reaches 
(the age of 13 years or the happening of other condi t ions wnich wi l l require a 
10 i'sale of the heme and ecual d iv is ion of the ecu i tv or buv cut of the defendan' 
i ' . . . 
11 lUncer t n i s j o i n t custody arrangement, if e i t h e r par ty moves from the City of 





patter of custody may be examined upon application to the court. 
3. The parties own real property and a heme thereon, and the equity in 
15 i'saic property and heme will be divided equally after the defendant receives a 
$6,000 credit frcm proceeds due him from money he obtained from his parents 
(estate and used in the acquisition of said hone. Said heme shall be sold when 
13 I the voungest child res icing with derencant reacnes tne age or 13 years or wnen 
19 'defendant remarries, or when the parties hereto can mutually agree it is in 
|i 
on their 'test interest. 
" li 
21 '! 4. Both parties are mutually restrained against pnysicai abuse or 
22 '.harassment of the other and further restrained frcm any trespass upon the 
! 
I , 
?« 'o rccer tv of the o ther or takinc oersc-nal o rcce r tv from the other, exceot as i s 
ii 
2-1 •reasonably necessary to effectuate the management of the j o in t custody or tne 
II 
25 . pa r t i e s minor ch i ld ren here in . 
o^ The personal orccer tv of the p a r t i e s i s awarded as fellows: 
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a. Plaintiff is avaraec the 1983 Toyota Tercel subject to 
the debt due against the same together with all personal effects and 
clothing and personal effects and clothing of the minor child Curtis, 
and all other personal effects she has in her possession. 
b. Defendant is awarded all household furniture and 








l b if 
clothing of the minor chi ldren res id ing immediately with him and a l l 
other personal property in h i s possess ion , 
6. Defendant i s ordered to assume and pay a l l oc l i ga t i cns incurred bv 
\e p a r t i e s p r io r to the f i l ing of t h i s ac t ion for divorce including those 
advancements from his brother for the van acquired by the p a r t i e s and payments c 
any and a i l other items of property in defendant ' s possess ion. Defendant sha l l 
not be responsible for the debt on the 1983 Toyota Tu rce i i which sha l l be paid h 
[the p l a i n t i f f . 
7. The court finds tha t p l a i n t i f f i s unable to meet the reasonable 
heeds of herse l f and her minor ch i ld , and therefore defendant i s ordered to 
\7 jbay as ch i ld support in the sum of $200.00 per month and add i t iona l ly pay to 
i£ ' p l a in t i f f the sum of S200.0C oer month as alimonv, for a t o t a l monthlv amount c 
I! 
19 of S400.0C per month for the support and maintenance of the p l a i n t i f f and the 
on miner cn i id . Said chi ld sucoort s n a i l continue thrcuch the mineritv vears of ti-
ll " ~ 
2; minor ch i ld and continue t i l l the age 13 so long as said ch i ld i s l iv ing with 
ii 
79 p l a i n t i f f unmarried. Said sums of ch i ld succor t and alimony are due on or befc 
22 the 5th day of each month beginning on the 5th day of tne next month af ter t.ie 
2i cour t signs the Decree of Divorce he re in . 
2- 8. The court further finds t h a t defendant i s a oa r t i c i oan t with ves t s 
ji 
26 ''eights in the Utah Retirement System Program and the cour t has received 
0 
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information regarding the anocr.ts attributed to defendant in said program. The 
information has been obtained and the court finds these documents will be 
sealed in the court file and that the figure shown on the members annual 
statement for the year 1982 be updated to the date of Corplaint for divorce 
Iwhich was filed on August. 18, 1983, and that as of that date the plaintiff is 
'awarded a one-half interest in whatever retirement benefit would have been 
payable to the defendant had he retired as of tnat date. That amount is oevabi 
8 «5anc due to the plaintiff by the defendant upon the retirement of the defendant, 
or one-half the cash value of defendant's interest, oavabie in cash or monthlv 
10 ins ta l lments of not to exceed twenty years a t ten percent i n t e r e s t , such 
11 jpavments to bee in Januarv 1, 1985. 
12 —• P l a i n t i f f was required to r e t a i n the se rv ices of an at torney to 
13 br ine t h i s proceeding and agreed to pay him a reasonable fee for h i s services 
14 llwhich the cour t finds to be the sum'of $500.00, for which SUIT, the p l a i n t i f f i s 
15 ,/entitied to a judgment against defendant for the use and benef i t of her 
* *"' ii 
15 a t to rney . 
17 I 12. Defendant is hereby required to maintain through his employment or 
j l 
18 -ecuivalent o o i i c i e s a l l avai lable hea l th , inedicai, accident and denta l insuranc 
i " ' ~, 
19 under a policy with h is employer, i n d u c i n g tne minor cnu_c m p i a m t i r r s 
2Q immediate care and custody. 
f) 
CATED t h i s / L day of Jun6f, 1984 
/ / 
• u l A i e 0>- U I A P 1 Si 
9 - ..COUNT? OF UTAH \ 01S7*1CT COO** 
- ~ j. I, THS UNDESIGNED, C » * ^j-J*^TIFUTHAT THi 
* l0* UTAH COUNTY. UTAJ- 2 - *Z*'~-
 A ^ p Z'J' COP? C< 
- 4 ' ' A N N ? - ' - ? AHO -OR5GOINS ^ T . 1
 l N " M v C - = i C = AS ! - 0 
^ \rH CS.G.NAL DOCUMENT ON rtur IN ™ -
n K ' '"'"'^TNSSS UY HANO AND S'cAL OF SAIC CC'J? ' ^ 
r*v rrrc*r Qjdrd: 






1*1 — — — 





STOTT P. HARSTON (1395) 
ALDRICK, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
^3 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 373-^912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAREE R. NIELSEN, 
: ORDER MODIFYING DIVORCE 
P l a i n t i f f , : DECREE 
vs. : 
Civil No. 6^,587 
ROBIN A. NIELSEN, : 
Judge George E. Eallif 
Defendant. 
This matter came up regularly on July -18, 1986, at 3:00 
o'clock p.m. for a hearing pursuant to Plaintiff's Petition to 
Modify the Divorce Decree heretofore entered, as well as 
Plaintiff's motions for temporary relief and related matters, 
pending final disposition in the matter. Plaintiff appeared and 
was represented by counsel, Scott P. Karston of Alcrich, Nelson, 
Weight 4 Esplin, and Defendant appeared anc was represented by 
his counsel, Dale A. Andersen, Esq., with proceecings before the 
Honorable Jucge George £. Eallif. Wherefore, the parties having 
stipulated on the record as to the terms of these proceedings, 
and the Court being fully -advised m the premises, and gcca cause 
appearing , 
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECRIED that the 
























be m o d i f i e d , as f o l l o w s : 
1. There has been a m a t e r i a l change in c i r c u m s t a n c e s s i n c e 
t h e D i v o r c e Decree was'- e n t e r e d , i n t h a t D e f e n d a n t i s new 
i n c a r c e r a t e d in t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n fo r a t h r e e - y e a r minimum 
m a n d a t o r y s e n t e n c e , bu t which ecu id be f o r a te rm of up t o 
f i f t e e n (15) y e a r s , -the same b e i n g for t h e c r ime cf s e x u a l abuse 
of a c h i l d . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , in t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of a l l t h e 
p a r t i e s 1 f o u r (4 ) m i n e r c h i l d r e n t h a t t h e f u l l c u s t o d y and 
c o n t r o l cf s a i d c h i l d r e n be awarded t o P l a i n t i f f h e r e i n , and t h e 
same i s sc o r d e r e d . 
2 . B e c a u s e c f D e f e n d a n t ' s c u r r e n t and p r o s p e c t i v e 
i n c a r c e r a t i o n in t h e Utah'- S t a t e P r i s o n h ' i s c h i l d s u p p o r t 
o b l i g a t i o n i s hereby modif ied and r e d u c e d to t h e amount of One 
Hundred D o l l a r s ($100 .00) per c h i l d per month p l u s One H u n d r e d 
D o l l a r s ( $ 1 0 0 . 0 0 ) per month in a l imony , t o t a l l i n g Five Hundred 
D o l l a r s ($500 .00) per month as cf and b e g i n n i n g wi th t h e d a t e of 
t h i s h e a r i n g . D e f e n d a n t ' s r e l e a s e from p r i s o n , i f and when i t 
o c c u r s , s h a l l be deemed a m a t e r i a l c h a n g e in c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n 
t h i s m a t t e r . 
3 . P l a i n t i f f s h a l l be g r a n t e d f u l l , c o m p l e t e and s o l e 
p o s s e s s i o n of the heme cf t h e p a r t i e s l o c a t e d a t 716 West 580 
S o u t h , C i t y of Or em, Utan C o u n t y , u n t i l t h e y o u n g e s t of t h e 
p a r t i e s 1 miner c h i l d r e n have r eached t h e ase cf m a j o r i t y . 
'J e : en! s i r e a s o n a b l e r i g h t s o 


























accommodate such visitation between the parties' children anc 
their father insofar as saic cmldren desire to anc be allowed to 
visit their father while in prison, and Plaintiff shall net 
instruct said minor chilcren not to visit their father or in any 
way hinder such visitation. 
5. Plaintiff is hereby grantee judgment against Defencant 
as and for her one-half interest and ecuity m Defendant's Utah 
State Retirement Fund, and as Defencant has withdrawn m s money 
from said Retirement Fund entirely, and Plaintiff is now entitled 
to judgment for ner interest therein under the terms ana as of 
the date Decree of Divorce heretofore entered, m the amount of 
$ 1 7-
 y 8 5 H - 14; plus interest at the legal rate from the date 
of said Divorce Decree, 
6, Plaintiff is grantee judgment against Defendant m the 
amount of $ M \ \ • ^ -^ , as and for a reasonable attorney's 
fee, plus costs in the amount of $ M H , |5 , noting the 
Affidavit m Supocrt of Attorney's Fees, and the Memorandum of 
Costs anc Disoursement fiiec herewith. 
Y THE COURT tms / ^  day of 198 7 
u 
JUDGE GEC^GE E. BALL: 
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STOTT P. HARSTON (1395) 
ALDRICK, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Eox »L" 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAREE R. NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBIN ADAIR NIELSEN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 64587 
(Commissioner Maetani) 
This matter came regularly before the above-entitled Court 
on January 12, 1988, at 10:00 a.m., Defendant having regularly 
been served on December 16, 1987, and this matter having been 
continued one week from the date originally set of January 5, 
1988, pursuant to request of defense counsel, Glen J. Ellis of 
Ellis & Ellis, the matter being heard before the Honorable 
Commissioner Howard H. Maetani, Plaintiff appearing in person and 
represented by counsel, .Stott; P. Harston of Aldrich, Nelson, 
Weight & Esplin, and neither defense counsel nor the Defendant 
present, the matter appearing before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking judgment on back-due and 
unpaid child support and alimony, as set forth in Plaintiff's 
: H . NELSON. 
IT & ESPLIN 
Affidavit heretofore served upon Defendant; and is again proffered 
in the Court, and good cause appearing, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises, it is hereby CRDERED, ADJUDGED and 
DECREED: 
1 . Thau judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff and 
against Defendant for 1 A months delinquent child support 
beginning August 1986 through and including November 1987 in the 
amount of $400.00 per month, for a total of $6,400.00 thereon; 
and 
2. That judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff and 
against Defendant for 14 mon,ths delinquent alimony beginning 
August 1986 through and including November 1987 in tne amount of 
3100.00 per month, for a total of $1,600.00, for a total judgment 
for delinquent child support and delinquent alimony in the amount 
of $8,000.00. 
DATED tnis / cay of jC^XU. j7 )/fcQ. 
BY THE COURT: 
EXHIBIT 12 












































JUDGEMENT PLUS INTEREST* 
*@ 12% per Annum 
Judgement signed May 15,1987, as referred to in Notice of Judgement July 21,1987. 
Original sum of Judgement: $13,815.74 
Amount paid by Rodney Nielsen: $10,288.93 (Paid from Robin Nielsen's Retirement) 
Balance unpaid: $ 3,526.81 
Interest accrued and unpaid: $ 8,089.63 








































































[ EXHIBIT NQ.^  / f 5 
CHILD SUPPORT/ALIMONY SCHEDULE: 
PRINCIPALyiNTEREST 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHILD SUPPORT/ALIMONY SCHEDULE: 
Page 4 
MONTH: BEGINNING INTEREST: ALIMONY: CHILD ENDING 























































































DISPOSITIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amend-
ments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is 
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to 
be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved 
thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such 
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the 
merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting 
party to meet such evidence. 
Rule 15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to 
the date of the original pleading. 
